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ABSTRACT: Recently, it has being speculated that the linear relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth may be misspecified. In our study, we contribute to the 
literature by investigating a nonlinear expenditure-growth relationship for South Africa by 
applying threshold cointegration analysis to six variations of Wagner’s law. Indeed, our 
empirical analysis reveal a nonlinear relationship between the time series for four out of the six 
versions of Wagner’s law thus providing strong evidence of existing nonlinearities for the case 
of South Africa. We further find uni-directional causality running from government spending 
to output productivity with positive increases in government expenditure leading to improved 
GDP levels hence lending support to the Keynesian hypothesis. And yet, we also find that 
negative deviations from the steady-state are eradicated slower than positive ones hence 
implying that increases in government spending would be offset by negative shocks to the 
macroeconomy over the long-run. This implies that excessive spending by South African 
government is not a panacea in overcoming the adverse effects of the recent global recession 
on the macroeconomy.   
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1 Introduction 
 
The investigation into the effects of government spending on economic growth is a 
fairly vibrant field of study which continues to draw increasing attention from academics and 
policymakers alike. Being complimentary to monetary policy in stabilizing the economy, 
government expenditure arguably represents the most important instrument of fiscal policy 
used in achieving this goal. In describing the benefits which government spending bears 
towards economic growth, Fallahi and Shoorkchali (2012) note that government spending 
establishes property rights, removes allocational distortions due to externalities, provides 
accessible schooling which contributes towards human capital development, enhances the 
investment environment through the provision of public goods as well as establishing law and 
order through regulations which contribute to economic growth by creating a safe environment. 
Conversely, some economists, like Odawara (2010), have argued that excessive government 
spending is detrimental to productivity growth since an overgrown government is often used 
inefficiently, crowds out investment, and results in higher interest payments and tax burdens. 
In light of this relationship between government spending and growth varying from one 
situation to another, it is imperative that researchers determine the extent to which government 
expenditure is either beneficial or detrimental towards economic growth in any particular 
economy. 
 
Academically, there exist three competing hypotheses regarding the relationship 
between government expenditure and economic growth. The first of these is Wagner’s 
hypothesis, which postulates causality running from economic growth to government 
expenditure. Ibok and Bassey (2013) state three reasons to support Wagner’s hypothesis. (i) 
During an industrialization era, the administrative and regulatory functions of the state would 
substitute for private activity (ii) An increase in income would shift consumption preferences 
in favour of cultural and welfare services which can be provided through government 
expenditure (iii) Government spending can provide the necessary capital funds required to 
finance large-scale projects tailored to satisfy the technological needs of an industrialized 
society, where private sector lacks the capacity to do so. The second hypothesis is the 
Keynesian hypothesis which suggests causality running from government expenditure to 
economic growth. Under this later hypothesis, when government spending increases, 
production also increases, and this leads to an increase in aggregate demand which ultimately 
leads to an increase in economic growth (Odhiambo, 2015). And finally, there is the classical 
hypothesis which assumes no causality between government spending and economic growth. 
According to this view, government’s fiscal policy does not have any effect on output growth, 
thus requiring government to avoid the risk of distorting the resource allocation through 
government intervention and allow the free markets to rein (Chipaumire et. al., 2014). 
 
A substantial amount of empirical efforts have been dedicated towards examining the 
relationship between government expenditure and economic growth, which in all fairness can 
be deemed as being inconclusive in nature. This statement holds true both across different 
countries and for same country analysis, as is the case with South Africa. Take for instance, 
the studies of Ansari et. al. (1997), Ziramba (2008), Ogbonna (2009), Menyah and Wolde-
Rufael (2012), Chipaumire et. al. (2014) and Odhiambo (2015) which have all analysed the 
relationship between government expenditure and economic growth for the case of South 
Africa and have obtained all sorts of conflicting empirical evidences. While Ogbonna (2009), 
Menyah and Wolde-Rufael (2012) and Odhiambo (2015) all find support for the Wagnerian 
hypothesis, on the other hand, Ansari et. al. (1997), Ziramba (2008) and Chipaumire et. al. 
(2014) reject Wagner’s hypothesis for South African data with the study of Chipaumire et. al. 
(2014) even postulating a negative relationship between the two variables. Given the overall 
inconclusive nature of these reported results for the aforementioned case studies, the debate 
pertaining to the nature and the direction of causality between government spending and 
economic growth in South Africa still remains open to further deliberation. 
 
Of recent, a growing number of academic works have challenged the notion of the 
relationship between government expenditure and economic growth being monotonic, thus 
advocating for a nonlinear relationship between the time series variables. Emerged empirical 
evidence supporting the notion of nonlinearities in the government spending-growth 
relationship has been documented for a number of economies inclusive of the United States 
(Grossman, 1988), Taiwan (Chen and Lee, 2005), South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, 
Thailand (Chiou et. al., 2010), Poland (Gurgul et. al., 2011), Sri Lanka (Herath, 2012) and Iran 
(Mehrara and Keikha, 2012), just to name a few. The phenomenon of a nonlinear relationship 
between government spending and economic growth is reminiscent of Bird’s (1972) ratchet 
hypothesis which depicts an inverted U-shaped relationship between the two variables. 
Theoretically, the notion of nonlinearities existing in the government spending-growth 
relationship bridges two previously opposing theories by hypothesizing on an initial positive 
relationship between the variables which turns negative after crossing some threshold or 
optimal point. Empirically, such nonlinearities have been captured through a number of 
nonlinear econometric models such as Hansen’s (1999) threshold autoregressive (TAR) model, 
smooth transition regressions (STR) of Terasvirata (1994) as well as nonlinear causality models 
such as those presented in Diks and Panchenko (2006). 
 
The purpose of our paper is to contribute to the literature by examining asymmetric 
cointegration relations between government expenditure and economic growth in South Africa, 
which is one of the largest economies in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) and the only African 
member of the prominent group of emerging economies, the BRICS countries. To the best of 
our knowledge this paper is the first to do so for the case of South Africa and we consider this 
an important contribution to the literature since previous literature has not accounted for 
possible nonlinearities in the data. In our study we make use of the momentum threshold 
autoregressive and threshold error correction (MTAR-TEC) model as our empirical 
framework. We choose this model because, unlike other conventional econometric models, the 
MTAR-TEC facilitates for asymmetric cointegration modelling and asymmetric causality 
analysis all under a singular econometric framework. This makes the MTAR-TEC model more 
robust in capturing cointegration nonlinearities in comparison to other competing econometric 
models used so far in the literature. 
 
Having laid the background to the study, the remainder of this article is structured as 
follows. The third section presents a brief review of the associated literature. The fourth section 
of the paper outlays the methodological framework for our empirical analysis. The fifth section 
presents the data and empirical results obtained from our estimations. The study is concluded 
in the sixth section of the paper in the form of policy implications and recommendations for 
the direction of future research. 
 
2 Government expenditure and economic growth in post-apartheid South 
Africa 
 
Following the democratic elections for South African in 1994, when the country 
transcended from it’s previous apartheid regime to a more democratic state, government was 
faced with the remarkable challenge of restoring fiscal discipline in light of a growing demand 
for governmental expenditure resulting from political democratization (Calitz and Siebtris, 
2003). With the end of the apartheid regime in 1994, the Government of National Unity adopted 
a Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) which, among many other goals, set 
numerical targets as fiscal guidelines used by policymakers. These targets included a budget 
deficit ratio of 2.5 percent of GDP and the achievement of a constant ratio of government 
revenue to GDP. During the early post-1994 period, government began to steadily increase 
investment expenditure on social and household infrastructure through the provision of 
housing, education, healthcare as well as through connecting households to electricity grids 
and water networks (Meyiwa et. al., 2004). In 1994 and 1995, the growth in South African 
government expenditure was 8.4 percent and 13.4 percent, respectively, which was a 
significant decrease from the previous 18.6 percent experienced in 1993. However, it is 
believed that this slower growth of government expenditures in the years immediately 
following the 1994 elections are not so much a reflection of a policy of fiscal constraint but are 
more of an attribute of high levels of government spending and the build-up of public debt 
inherited over fifty years under the Apartheid regime (Heintz, 2003). Economic growth, on the 
other hand, averaged 2.7 percent between 1994 and 1995, which is a favourable figure in 
comparison to the 0.6 percent average experienced between 1990 and 1993. Nevertheless, these 
economic growth rates were not as high as anticipated because of poor policy co-ordination 
and implementation methods used under the RDP programme.  
 
In 1996, the government phased in a new macroeconomic and fiscal policy programme, 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy, which sought to improve previously 
disappointing economic growth rates and to also reduce the budget deficit through the 
restructuring of government at national, provincial and municipal levels. And yet, in 1996, 
growth in government expenditure briefly escalated to an average of 16.35 percent due to 
government increased spending on social investment and in particular, spending on education, 
health, welfare, housing and water services. Due to exercises of increased fiscal discipline 
applied from 1997 to 2000, government expenditure growth figures were then lowered to 9.28 
percent, 7.2 percent, 5.1 percent and 6.3 percent, in these respective years. This period of 
decreased government spending was accompanied by lower economic growth performance 
with growth rates averaging 1.8 percent between 1997 and 1999. However, a less restrictive 
fiscal and counter-cyclical approach was then initiated in 2001, which saw government almost 
double its expenditure growth rates to 11.6 percent and increased these numbers to 12.8 
percent, 12.9 percent, 11.6 percent and 12.8 percent in the subsequent years of 2002, 2003, 
2004 and 2005, respectively. Notably, this increase in government spending was accompanied 
with improved economic growth figures of 3.5 percent over a four-year period of 2001-2004. 
It was in 2005, when the GEAR policy programme was phased out and ultimately replaced 
with Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) programme, which 
envisioned halving unemployment to less than 14 percent and attaining economic growth rate 
averages of 6 percent between 2010 and 2014. Public infrastructure was identified as a binding 
constraint within the ASIGSA programme as the National Budget of 2006 envisaged that 
R415.8 billion would be invested in infrastructure over a three-year period (Calitz and Fourie, 
2007). The country then experienced an all-time high post-apartheid economic growth rate of 
5.6 percent as well as an all-time high post-apartheid budget surplus of 3.5 percent in 2006, 
which gave fiscal authorities leeway to further step-up government consumption to an average 
of 14.8 percent 2006 and 2008.  
 
Following the subprime crisis of 2009, the South African economy fell into recession, 
averaging 1.5 percent GDP growth rate in 2009 but significantly picked up in the following 
two years, averaging 3.1 percent and 3.6 percent in 2010 and 2011, respectively. This quick 
recovery in economic growth rates after the recession was due to an ‘economic shield’ provided 
by government’s budget surplus experienced between 2006 and 2007, as well as government’s 
escalation of expenditure growth in 2008 and 2009, to record-high averages of 16.9 percent 
and 14.6 percent, respectively. In 2013, the Finance Ministry in conjunction with the 
Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission (PICC), announced a planned R827 
billion medium-term infrastructure investment expenditure framework. The PICC also set an 
infrastructure spending target of 10 percent of GDP which is to be met by the year 2030. 
Moreover, in 2013 the Finance Ministry appointed the Davis Tax Committee to limit 
government expenditure and boost revenue collection through tax reforms in order to fund key 
policy objectives such as infrastructure development. Moreover, public infrastructure 
development has been identified as the main job creation driver under the National 
Development Plan (NDP) and the New Growth Path (NGP) macroeconomic policies and 
expenditure on infrastructure is projected to be R11 trillion over a 15 year period of 2015 to 
2030. Nonetheless, growth in government expenditure lowered to an average of 8.4 percent 
between 2013 and 2015, and public investment infrastructure is current averaging 8 percent, 
which is below the 10 percent rate required in order for government to meet it’s long-term 
infrastructure objectives. On the other hand, real GDP growth has been on downward trend 
from 2013 to 2015, averaging rates of 1.9 percent, 1.4 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively 
along these years. 
  
3 Nonlinearities in Wagner’s law – A review of the literature 
 
The notion of a nonlinear relationship between government expenditure and economic 
growth in the academic literature can be traced back as far as Bird (1972), who argued that the 
variation in output growth and fiscal policy would differ, depending on whether the economy 
is in an expansionary or contractionary phase of the business cycle. Since then, there has 
emerged a number of theoretical models which account for an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between public spending and economic growth, and collectively these models are referred to 
as the BARS curve in commemoration of Barro (1990), Armey (1995), Rahn and Fox (1996) 
and Scully (1995). In quantifying such nonlinearities, empirical researchers are dependent on 
three types of econometric frameworks. The first of these frameworks, is the threshold 
autoregressive (TAR) and this model has been used in the studies of Chen and Lee (2005) for 
Taiwan, Odarawa (2010) for the US, Australia, Canada, Japan and the UK, Abounoori and 
Nademi (2010) and Mehrara and Keikha (2012) for Iran, Christie (2012) for 135 developing 
and developed countries, Asimakopoulos and Karavias (2015) for 129 developing and 
developed countries and Hajamini and Falahi (2014) for 21 low-income and 11 low-middle 
income countries. Most of the aforementioned studies employ three measures of government 
size (i.e. total government expenditure, government consumption and government investment) 
which are run as threshold variables against economic growth. Needless-to-say, the results 
obtained in these studies for various countries are quite contradictory, not only in terms the 
value of the threshold estimates, but also in terms of the depicted regime switching behaviour. 
For instance, the works of Chen and Lee (2005), Odarawa (2010), Mehrara and Keikha (2012), 
Abounoori and Nademi (2010) and Asimakopoulos and Karavias (2015) all show that the size 
of government has a significantly positive relationship with economic growth below the 
spending threshold level and this relationship turns negative or insignificant above this 
threshold. On the other hand, the studies of Christie (2012) and Hajamini and Falahi (2014) 
report an insignificant relationship between the two variables below the threshold level whereas 
the relationship turns significantly negative above the threshold point. All-in-all, the evidence 
given by the former cluster of empirical works depicts an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between government size and economic growth as described by endogenous growth theory, 
whereby such evidence is lacking for the latter studies. 
  
The second type of empirical framework used in the literature is the smooth transition 
regression (STR) model and this model is consider superior to other competing nonlinear 
models such as the TAR and the Markov Switching (MS) models since it encompasses other 
nonlinear models. Moreover, the STR model is more theoretical appealing since it’s transition 
from one regime state to another is smooth as opposed to being abrupt and the transition 
variable responsible for regime switching behaviour is endogenously determined. Studies 
which have used the STR model in the government spending-growth nexus include Fallahi and 
Shoorkchali (2012) for Greece, Chiou-Wei et.al. (2010) for South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Taiwan and Thailand, Mehdi and Shoorekchali (2012) for Italy and Su and Bui (2015) for 
ASEAN countries. Encouragingly, each of these studies establishes that government spending 
is responsible for regime switching behaviour amongst the time series variables. Furthermore, 
all countries investigated in this segment of reviewed literature, reveal that in the lower regime 
of the estimated STR models, government spending and economic growth are positively related 
whereas in the upper regime of the model the relationship is an inverse one. Once again, we 
treat this evidence as implying an inverted U-shaped relationship between government size and 
economic growth. The one exception is given for the case of Singapore whereby Chiou-Wei 
et. al. (2010) find converse regime switching behaviour for the country, thus implying a strict 
U-shaped relationship between the variables. Never-the-less the empirical evidence provided 
by these STR models provides more stringent evidence of an inverted U-shaped or a U-shaped 
relationship between government size and economic growth, since the described transition 
between the model regimes is smooth and is thus more theoretical valid. 
 
The third type of nonlinear empirical framework found in the literature are studies 
which use nonlinear granger causality testing procedures in examining the government 
spending-growth relationship. In differing from the previously discussed ‘nonlinear’ literature, 
this cluster of studies take into account cointegration properties of the time series thus ruling 
out the possibility of obtaining spurious regression estimates. Furthermore, the cumulative 
evidence of a positive relationship between public spending and economic growth at low levels 
of expenditure, has been largely misinterpreted has been indicative of causality running from 
public spending to economic growth. This, in turn, creates the possibility of drawing 
misleading inferences and bogus policy implications from the empirical research. Nonetheless 
there has been a group of studies which use nonlinear causality models are belonging to this 
group are the works of Karagianni and Pempetzoglou (2009) for European Union countries, 
Grenade and Wright (2013) for Caribbean countries and Gurgul et. al. (2012) for Poland. 
Whilst Karagianni and Pempetzoglou (2009) and Gurgul et. al. respectively apply the modified 
nonlinear causality tests of Baek and Brook (1992) and that of Diks and Panchenko (2006), to 
individual countries, on the other hand, the study of Grenade and Wright (2013) applies the 
Baek and Brook (1992) tests within a panel framework. Overall, these nonlinear causality 
studies have failed to produce a deterministic causal relationship between government 
expenditure and economic growth for the various countries and panel groups under 
investigation thus rendering the subject matter open to further deliberation.  
 
4 Empirical Framework 
 
4.1 Empirical specifications of Wagner’s law 
 
For estimation purposes, Ziramba (2008), Karagianni and Pempetzoglou (2009) and 
Odhiambo (2015) identify six different empirical versions of Wagner’s law existing in the 
literature. These are; i) the Peacock-Wiseman (1961) version, ii) the Gupta (1967) version, iii) 
the Goffman (1968) version, iv) the Pryor (1969) version, v) the Musgrave (1969) version `and 
vi) the Mann (1980) version. For the Peacock-Wiseman (1961) and Pryor (1969) versions of 
Wagner’s law absolute values of time series are used in the regression specifications whereas 
for the remaining versions, at least one of the variables used is given in per capita terms. In 
denoting GDP as economic growth, Y as national income, GE as government expenditure, GC 
as government consumption, POP as total population and Log as a logarithmic transformation, 
we provide empirical estimation models for the six versions of Wagner’s law in Table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: Different functional forms of Wagner’s law 
Equation Functional form Author 
I Log GEt = α + β Log GDPt + 𝜉t1 Peacock-Wiseman (1961) 
II Log (GEt / POPt) = α + β Log (GDPt / POPt)+ 𝜉t3 Gupta (1967) 
III Log GEt = α + β Log (GDPt / POPt) + 𝜉t4 Goffman (1968) 
IV Log GCt = α + β Log Yt + 𝜉t2  Pryor (1969) 
V Log (GEt / Yt)= α + β Log (GDPt / POPt) + 𝜉t5 Musgrave (1969) 
VI Log (GEt / GDPt)= α + β Log (GDPt) + 𝜉t6 Mann (1980) 
 
4.2 MTAR-TEC modelling procedure 
 
As previously mentioned, most of the empirical literature investigating Wagner’s 
hypothesis for South African data has relied on linear cointegration frameworks to reach 
various conclusions. However, Enders and Siklos (2001), have criticized the conventional 
linear cointegration framework on the premise of low power associated with the linear 
framework when the underlying time series is indeed asymmetric. To facilitate for asymmetric 
cointegration analysis between time series variables, Enders and Siklos (2001) propose the 
modelling the long-run cointegration error terms as threshold processes. In referring back to 
the long-run regressions equations (I) through (VI), as reported in Table 1, we follow in pursuit 
of Enders and Silkos (2001) by allowing the long-run residual deviations (𝜉ti) to behave as 
threshold processes. In accordance with the authors, we propose two different asymmetric 
versions for modelling the error terms from the long-run regressions. The first is the TAR 
threshold cointegration model: 
 
𝜉𝑡 = 𝜌1𝜉𝑡(𝜉𝑡 < 𝜏) + 𝜌2𝜉𝑡(𝜉𝑡 ≥ 𝜏) + 𝜈𝑡      (1) 
 
And the second is the MTAR threshold cointegration model: 
 
𝜉𝑡 = 𝜌1𝜉𝑡(𝛥𝜉𝑡 < 𝜏) + 𝜌2𝜉𝑡(𝛥𝜉𝑡 ≥ 𝜏) + 𝜈𝑡      (2) 
 
Where Δ is a first difference operator and τ is the unknown threshold value which is 
estimated using a minimizing function as described in Hansen (2000). For both TAR and 
MTAR versions of the model, Enders and Silkos (2001) advice the testing of two hypothesis, 
the first being for cointegration effects and the second one being for asymmetric cointegration 
effects. The null hypothesis of no cointegration is given as H10: 𝜌1 = 𝜌 2 and is tested against 
the alternative of cointegration amongst the variables (i.e. H11: 𝜌1 ≠ 𝜌2). If the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration is rejected, then one can proceed to further test for the null hypothesis of 
linear cointegration (i.e. H20: 𝜌1 = 𝜌2 = 0) against the alternative of asymmetric cointegration 
(H21: 𝜌1 ≠ 𝜌2 ≠ 0). Once the null hypothesis of linear cointegration is rejected in favour of the 
alternative of threshold cointegration effects, then the short and long-run dynamics of 
equilibrium adjustment can be modelled through a corresponding threshold error correction 
(TEC) specifications which are specified as follows: 
 
(
𝛥𝑦𝑡
𝛥𝑥𝑡
) = 𝛾1𝜉𝑡−1(𝜉𝑡 < 𝜏) + ∑ 𝛼𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛥𝑥𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + {𝛾2𝜉𝑡−1(𝜉𝑡 ≥ 𝜏) + ∑ 𝛼𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 +
∑ 𝛽𝛥𝑥𝑡−𝑖}
𝑝
𝑖=1 + 𝜇𝑡         (3) 
 
(
𝛥𝑦𝑡
𝛥𝑥𝑡
) = 𝛾1𝜉𝑡−1(𝛥𝜉𝑡 < 𝜏) + ∑ 𝛼𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛥𝑥𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + {𝛾2𝜉𝑡−1(𝛥𝜉𝑡 ≥ 𝜏) +
∑ 𝛼𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝛥𝑥𝑡−𝑖}
𝑝
𝑖=1 + 𝜇𝑡       (4) 
  
Regressions (3) and (4) are formal known as the TAR-TEC and MTAR-TEC 
regressions, respectively, hereby t-1 denotes the equilibrium error term. Based on these 
threshold error correction (TEC) regressions, two main sets of hypothesis can be tested for. 
Firstly, the null hypothesis of no asymmetric error correction model (i.e. H30: 𝛾1≠𝛾2) can be 
tested against the alternative of threshold error correction model (i.e. H31: 𝛾1=𝛾2). Secondly, 
the direction of causality amongst the time series can be evaluated by testing whether all values 
of Δxt-i and Δyt-i are significantly different from zero. In particular, the null hypothesis that yt 
does not granger cause xt is tested as H40: αi = 0 whereas the null hypothesis that xt does not 
granger cause yt is tested as H50: βi = 0. 
 
5 Data and empirical analysis 
 
5.1 Empirical data 
 
The time series data used in the study has been collected from two main sources, 
namely; the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) and the Federal Reserve Economic Data 
(FRED) online databases. The data consists of the gross domestic product at market prices 
(GDP), gross domestic product per capita (GDP.POP), gross national income (Y), national 
government total expenditure (GE), final government consumption (GC), ratio of government 
expenditure to GDP (GE.POP) and the total population (POP). The variables GDP, Y, GE and 
GC have been collected in millions of Rands whereas population is depicted in millions of 
people. Moreover, from this data, we are able to compute two other variables namely, i) the 
ratio of government expenditure to national income (GE.Y) as GE/Y, and ii) government 
expenditure per capita (GE.POP) as GE/POP. Also note that all data used in the study has being 
converted into natural logarithms for empirical purposes. 
 
5.2 Unit root tests  
 
As a preliminary step to our empirical analysis, we perform unit root tests on the time 
series. For this purpose, we rely on three type of unit root tests, namely, the Augment Dickey-
Fuller (ADF), Phillips-Perron (PP) and Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (ERS) unit root tests. 
Whilst the PP unit root test is merely a non-parametric modification to the ADF-statistic to 
account for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity that may be present in the data generating 
process (DGP) of a time series whereas, the ERS unit root tests uses a modified DF-statistic 
based on generalized least squares (GLS) de-trending rationale and exhibits improved power 
at near stationary unit root autoregressive coefficients in a small sample size. We perform each 
of the tests with a drift and with a trend, and we report the results in Table 2 below. As can be 
observed, the null hypothesis of unit roots cannot be rejected for all the time series in their 
levels, hence ruling out the possibility of the time series variables being stationary I(0) 
processes. However, when the time series are converted into their first differences, the unit root 
test results provide overriding evidence for the rejection of the unit root hypothesis hence 
rendering each of the time series as first difference stationary I(1) processes.  
 
Table 2: Unit root test results  
time series test statistic levels first differences 
  drift trend drift trend 
GE ADF -3.40** -2.92 -5.16*** -5.49*** 
 PP -2.81 -2.32 -9.76*** -10.72*** 
 ERS 
 
-2.53 -1.03 0.72 -2.52 
GDP ADF -1.48 -2.07 -5.72*** -5.93*** 
 PP -1.61 -1.75 -5.76*** -5.84*** 
 ERS 
 
0.46 -1.27 -3.80*** -4.22*** 
GE.POP ADF -0.84 -1.51 -6.16*** -6.16*** 
 PP -0.81 -2.13 -10.18*** -10.13*** 
 ERS 
 
0.08 -1.47 -3.30** -3.66*** 
GDP.POP ADF -2.64* -2.51 -6.39*** -6.56*** 
 PP -2.42 -2.38 -8.78*** -8.89*** 
 ERS 
 
-0.33 -1.56 -3.25*** -3.24** 
GC ADF -2.08 -3.35* -6.11*** -6.05*** 
 PP -1.81 -2.89 -6.13*** -6.06*** 
 KPSS 
 
-0.87 -3.02* -4.29*** -4.16*** 
Y ADF -1.68 -2.07 -5.21*** -5.39*** 
 PP -1.56 -1.73 -6.25*** -6.39*** 
 ERS 
 
0.36 -1.44 -3.08*** -3.68*** 
GE.Y ADF -2.47 0.24 -3.75*** -4.44*** 
 PP -2.43 0.55 -4.98*** -5.74*** 
 ERS 
 
-0.14 -0.87 -1.46 -1.78 
GE.GDP ADF -0.84 -1.51 -6.16*** -6.12*** 
 PP -0.81 -2.13 -10.18*** -10.13*** 
 ERS -0.08 -1.47 -3.30*** -3.66*** 
Notes: Significance codes: “***”, “**” and “*” denote that the test statistics are significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Critical 
values for the unit root tests are given as follows. For the ADF unit root test with a drift, the 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -3.51, -2.89 
and -2.58, respectively. For the ADF unit root test with a trend, the 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -4.04, -3.45 and -3.15, respectively. 
For the PP unit root test with a drift, the 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -3.55, -2.92 and -2.60, respectively. For the PP unit root test with 
a trend, the 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -4.13, -3.49 and -3.18, respectively. For the ERS unit root test with a drift, the 1%, 5% and 
10% critical values are -2.61, -1.95 and -1.62, respectively. For the ERS unit root test with a trend, the 1%, 5% and 10% critical values are -
3.58, -3.03 and -2.74, respectively. 
 
5.3 Threshold cointegration tests 
 
 Having, concluded that each of the time series exhibits I(1) behaviour, we proceed to 
model TAR and MTAR models for the six versions of Wagner’s law i.e. Equations I to VI in 
Table 3. That gives us a total of 12 estimation equations. As a preliminary step, we test for 
three hypothesis pertaining to cointegration and error-correction effects from the errors 
obtained from estimates of the 12 threshold regression equations. To recall, the first hypothesis 
(H01) tests for the null of no cointegration effects; the second hypothesis (H02) tests the null 
hypothesis of linear cointegration effects; and the third hypothesis (H03) tests the null of no 
threshold error correction effects. The results pertaining to testing of these hypotheses are 
reported in Table 4. As can be observed from Table 2, none of the TAR regressions manages 
to reject all three null hypotheses thus rendering these regressions as inappropriate for 
estimation purposes. However, we find that the MTAR regressions for Wagner equations I, II, 
IV and VI successfully reject all three null hypotheses thus implying that these four MTAR 
models can be used to model long-run threshold cointegration effects and corresponding 
threshold error correction (TEC) effects. We proceed to do so in the following sub-section. 
 
Table 3: Threshold cointegration test results 
 TAR model MTAR model 
 H10 H20 H30 H10 H20 H30 
Equation       
I 2.47 
(0.09)* 
1.96 
(0.17) 
4.19 
(0.04)** 
6.17 
(0.00)*** 
8.96 
(0.00)*** 
6.39 
(0.02) ** 
II 4.05 
(0.02)* 
2.59 
(0.11) 
0.21 
(0.65) 
8.52 
(0.00)*** 
10.52 
(0.00)*** 
3.08 
(0.08)* 
III 2.47 
(0.09)* 
1.96 
(0.17) 
0.43 
(0.52) 
1.44 
(0.25) 
0.01 
(0.91) 
4.19 
(0.04)** 
IV 55.72 
(0.00)*** 
3.83 
(0.05)* 
0.30 
(0.59) 
55.47 
(0.00)*** 
3.66 
(0.06)* 
2.50 
(0.10)* 
V 2.93 
(0.06)* 
2.87 
(0.09)* 
0.24 
(0.63) 
2.00 
(0.15) 
1.12 
(0.29) 
0.21 
(0.65) 
VI 4.07 
(0.02)* 
2.57 
(0.11) 
0.42 
(0.52) 
8.42 
(0.00)*** 
10.44 
(0.00)*** 
10.65 
(0.00)*** 
Note: “***”, “**”, “*”, respectively denote the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels. The p-values are reported in (). 
 
5.4 Threshold cointegration and error correction model estimates 
 
Having verified threshold cointegration and error correction effects for four out of the 
six Wagner’s functional equations, we proceed to estimate the MTAR-TEC specifications for 
these functional equations and report the results in Table 4 below. 
 
Table 4: MTAR-TEC estimates 
 Equation I Equation II Equation IV Equation VI 
 ge gdp ge.pop gdp.pop gc Y ge.gdp Gdp 
α0 66.89 
(0.00)*** 
 7.11 
(0.00)*** 
 0.01 
(0.99) 
 7.11 
(0.00)*** 
 
α1 0.04 
(0.00)*** 
 4.58 
(0.00)*** 
 0.79 
(0.00)*** 
 0.46 
(0.00)*** 
 
Τ 4.30  81.71      
𝜌1 -0.51 
(0.00)*** 
 -0.16 
(0.02)* 
 -0.73 
(0.00)*** 
 -0.51 
(0.00)*** 
 
𝜌2 -0.01 
(0.91) 
 -0.07 
(0.77) 
 -1.09 
(0.00)*** 
 -0.04 
(0.58) 
 
         
𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑘
+  0.47 
(0.03)** 
-3.99 
(0.26) 
0.31 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.76) 
0.39 
(0.06)* 
-0.12 
(0.64) 
0.22 
(0.85) 
0.29 
(0.17) 
𝛥𝑦𝑡−𝑘
−  -0.29 
(0.42) 
3.39 
(0.57) 
0.15 
(0.61) 
0.01 
(0.79) 
-0.07 
(0.82) 
-0.16 
(0.69) 
0.21 
(0.89) 
0.19 
(0.50) 
𝛥𝑥𝑡−𝑘
+  0.03 
(0.28) 
7.30 
(0.09)* 
8.15 
(0.20) 
0.93 
(0.81) 
-0.16 
(0.21) 
0.32 
(0.07)* 
4.23 
(0.23) 
1.08 
(0.08)* 
𝛥𝑥𝑡−𝑘
−  0.01 
(0.83) 
-3.68 
(0.00)*** 
-2.01 
(0.54) 
-7.00 
(0.06)** 
-0.11 
(0.74) 
-0.78 
(0.09)* 
-6.34 
(0.00)*** 
-0.83 
(0.60) 
𝜆+𝜉𝑡−1
+  0.02 
(0.33) 
7.55 
(0.21) 
-0.02 
(0.76) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.49 
(0.00)*** 
-0.14 
(0.34) 
0.01 
(0.76) 
0.68 
(0.01)** 
𝜆−𝜉𝑡−1
−  -0.01 
(0.78) 
-3.17 
(0.05)* 
-0.06 
(0.10)* 
0.01 
(0.21) 
0.09 
(0.71) 
0.42 
(0.22) 
-0.06 
(0.07)* 
-0.21 
(0.18) 
         
R2 0.31 0.46 0.39 0.19 0.84 0.26 0.50 0.21 
Dw 2.11 
(0.96) 
2.20 
(0.60) 
2.18 
(0.73) 
2.23 
(0.55) 
2.02 
(0.95) 
2.41 
(0.20) 
2.16 
(0.78) 
2.16 
(0.73) 
Note: “***”, “**”, “*”, respectively denote the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels. The p-values are reported in (). 
 
As can be observed from Table 4, all estimated regressions produce positive long-run 
regression coefficients (i.e. α1), with these long-run elasticities ranging from 0.04 to 4.58. This 
result is not only coherent with Wagner’s original proposition, but also joins a host of other 
empirical works which find a similar positive relationship for South African data (i.e. Ansari 
et. al. (1997), Ziramba (2008), Ogbonna (2009), Menyah and Wolde-Rufael (2012) and 
Odhiambo (2015)). In focusing on the coefficient estimates of our threshold error correction 
terms (i.e. p1, p2), we find that the coefficient estimates above the threshold are significantly 
larger than the estimates below the threshold (i.e. p1 < p2) for equations I, II and VI. This 
implies that positive deviations of the time series variables from their long-run steady-state 
equilibrium are eradicated at a quicker rate than negative deviations for equilibrium 
relationships between i) government expenditure and GDP ii) per capita government 
expenditure and per capita GDP iii) government consumption component and national income, 
and iv) ratio between government expenditure. The opposite holds true for equation VI, from 
which we observe that negative deviations from the long-run equilibrium are eradicated quicker 
than positive deviations (i.e. p1 > p2) between the ratio of government expenditure to GDP and 
GDP. 
 
Concerning error correction behaviour, we find that at least one significantly negative 
error correction term for each of the estimated MTAR-TEC models, thus signifying equilibrium 
reverting behaviour of the variables in the face of external shocks or disturbances to the system 
over the steady-state. As can be also seen from Table 4, the estimates of the lagged differences 
of the time series are, for the most part of it, insignificant thus implying the absence of 
equilibrium dynamic behaviour of the variables over the short-run. As can also be observed in 
Table 4, the estimates of the error correction terms vary from -0.064 to -0.316, a result which 
implies that between 6.4 percent and 31.6 percent of disequilibrium from the steady-state are 
corrected annually. However, we note inconsistencies in the short-run equilibrium dynamics 
as a majority of the differenced lagged variables turn out to be insignificant thus ruling out the 
possibility of any consistent short-run behaviour amongst the time series.  
 
Lastly, we perform, granger causality tests for each of the estimated MTAR-TEC model 
regressions and we report the results in Table 5 below. As can be observed, the F-statistics 
testing the null hypothesis of the dependent variable granger causing the dependent variable 
exceeds the tabulated critical values at all levels of significance for equations I, II and VI), 
hence reject the null hypothesis. Conversely, F-statistic testing the null of the dependent 
variable granger causing the independent variable is lower than the critical values at all levels 
of significance for equations I, II and VI whereas the test statistic exceeds the critical value for 
equation IV. Collectively, these results imply granger causality running from i) government 
expenditure to GDP, ii) per capita GDP to per capita GDP, iii) national income to government 
consumption, and iv) share of government expenditure in GDP to GDP. Notably, these results 
are in coherence with those presented in Ogbonna (2009), Menyah and Wolde-Rufael (2012) 
and Odhiambo (2015), who presented similar evidence for the South African economy albeit 
using different econometric techniques. 
 
Table 5: Granger causality tests 
equation dependent 
variable (y) 
independent 
variable (x) 
x granger 
causes y 
y granger 
causes x 
Decision 
   F-stat F-stat  
I ge gdp 7.79 
(0.00)*** 
0.67 
(0.52) 
ge  gdp 
II ge.pop gdp.pop 10.67 
(0.00)*** 
1.06 
(0.35) 
ge.pop  gdp.pop 
IV gc Y 1.58 
(0.22) 
8.76 
(0.00)*** 
Y  gc 
 
VI ge.gdp gdp 8.76 
(0.00)*** 
1.58 
(0.22) 
ge.gdp  gdp 
Note: “***”, “**”, “*”, respectively denote the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent significance levels. P-values are reported in ().  indicates 
direction of causality. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Primary motivated by the recent surge of empirical research which has hypothesized on 
a nonlinear relationship between government expenditure and economic growth, our study 
sought to contribute to the literature by investigating nonlinearities in Wagner’s law for the 
case of South Africa, one of the largest economies in the SSA region. To this end, we apply 
MTAR and TEC econometric techniques to model the asymmetric cointegration relationship 
for six functional forms of Wagner’s law. Indeed our empirical results indicate a nonlinear 
relationship between government expenditure and output productivity hence insinuating that 
previously used linearly specification may be misspecified. Nonetheless, in similarity to a 
majority of previous case studies conducted for the South Africa economy, we find a positive 
long-run relationship between different proxies of government spending and output 
productivity as well as finding causality running from government spending to GDP levels. 
These results generally lay support for the Keynesian hypothesis which contends for 
government spending causing an improvement economic growth within a country and 
ultimately our results render government spending as an exogenous factor of economic growth 
in South Africa in terms of both levels and per capita measures. We further deem these results 
as being plausible since historical data has shown that government spending in South Africa 
has significantly increased following an economic crisis or pandemic to the economy, and this, 
more often than not, leads to periodic increases in economic growth rates. For instance, during 
the recent global recession period of 2009, government spending increased immensely and this 
was accompanied by improvements in output productivity in the following few years 
afterwards. Notably, this is in compliance with our empirical finding of government 
expenditure granger causing economic growth. However, one exception to our results concerns 
the correlation between government consumption component and national income (GNI) in 
which we find causal effects running from government consumption to income received by 
South African residents. This may be the case, when considering that taxation incurred by 
South African residents maybe a primary source of government revenue income thus inferring 
causality running from GNI to government consumption items. Nonetheless, we conclude on 
overriding evidence of total government expenditure, inclusive of both spending and 
investment items, leading to economic growth thus magnifying the role which government 
spending activities exerts on future economic development and prosperity in the country.  
 
Based on the analysis of our estimated threshold equilibrium errors, we also find that 
in the event of a shock to the variables, negative deviations are slower to be eradicated in 
comparison to positive deviations. This latter result implies that negative developments in the 
economic variables have longer lasting effects than positive ones do. This is demonstrable by 
the recent global financial crisis of 2007 and resulting global depression of 2009, which is 
largely responsible for the declining growth in GDP experienced over the last couple of years. 
And even though government spending has been extensively applied to circumvent the effects 
of the global recession, the negative shocks still appear to be outweighing the positive shocks 
as economic growth is currently on a downward trend. This observation is important, since it 
implies that current government spending in isolation may not be enough to overcome the 
adverse effects of the global recession on the South African macroeconomy. Another factor 
worth taking note of is that increased government spending activities tend to be accompanied 
by larger government debt and budget deficits which has recently been shown to crowd out 
investment in South Africa (Biza et. al. 2015). It should thus be a goal of government to firstly 
find alternative forms of financing besides that of incurring more government debt and risking 
the possibility of overwhelming interest payments on such debt. One plausible avenue for 
future financing of government spending activities is through increasing reliance on indirect 
taxation and putting less emphasis on direct taxes. Government also needs to be also concerned 
with devising policies which improve coordination between fiscal and monetary policies with 
the common agenda of increasing economic growth. We therefore recommend two important 
directions for future research into the debate. Firstly, future research should be directed towards 
examining the effects of fiscal and monetary policies on the South African macroeconomy with 
the intention of identifying optimal policies which would stabilize macroeconomic volatilities. 
Secondly, future research should be done to access the trade-off effects of direct and indirect 
taxes, as sources of government revenue, on economic growth. 
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